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Econometrica, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March, 1970) 
THE PROBABILITY OF A CYCLICAL MAJORITY 
BY FRANK DEMEYER AND CHARLES R. PLOTT1 
CONSIDER A COMMITTEE or society attempting to order the alternatives (X1, X2, X3) 
by use of majority rule. Each individual is assumed to have a strong ordering 
(called a profile) on the alternatives. "Indifference" isnot a property of the profiles. 
The committee is said to "prefer" Xi to Xj, denoted XiCXj if Xi is preferred 
to Xj on a majority of the individual profiles. It is well known that if certain indivi- 
dual profiles are chosen, the resulting "social ordering" may be cyclical, i.e., 
XiCXj, XjCXk, XkCXi. Such a result is called a "cycle." 
Two aspects of this problem have been of interest. The first is that of placing 
conditions on individual profiles necessary and sufficient for the resulting social 
ordering to contain a cycle (see [1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13]). The second is that of obtain- 
ing the probability that certain types of cycles occur-given that individuals are 
allowed to choose at random among all possible profiles. This probability depends 
upon the number of people (always assumed to be odd) and the number of alter- 
natives. 
There are three different probabilities of interest. We let n = 2in + 1 be the odd 
number of individuals (m is a positive integer) and we let r > 3 be the number of 
alternatives. The probabilities of interest are: 
(i) Q(m, r): the probability that one issue is preferred by a majority to all other 
issues; 
(ii) P(m, r): the probability that the social ordering is completely transitive 
(contains no cycle); 
(iii) Z(m, r): the probability that one issue is preferred by a majority to all other 
issues and the complete social ordering contains a cycle. 
Very little is known about these functions. Duncan Black [2] found that 
P(1, 3) = .9444, ..., by complete enumeration. David Klahr [7] found Q(1, 4) = 
.8888, ..., by enumeration. Monte Carlo techniques were used [3, 7] to estimate 
Q(m, r) for small values of the variables. All of these probabilities are for the case 
where choices over the profiles are equally likely. 
Our analysis will proceed as follows. In Section 1, we will derive the special 
case for P(m, 3) = Q(m, 3) and the choices are completely random. This is done 
in order to acquaint the reader with the notation used in the following sections. 
In Section 2, we derive Q(m, r). In Section 3, we derive P(m, r). In the final section, 
we present some numerical values for Q(m, r) and P(m, r). 
Before continuing, we can deal with Z(m, r) directly. We simply observe that 
if the social ordering is completely transitive (contains no cycle), then one issue 
1 This paper was delivered at the meeting of the Econometric Society, Chicago, 1966. The material 
in Section 2 has been treated independently in two papers published since the writing of this paper 
[5, 10]. The authors wish to thank Otto Davis, Morton Kamien, and David Klahr for their comments 
and suggestions. 
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346 F. DEMEYER AND C. R. PLOTT 
is preferred by a majority to all others. It follows directly that 
(1) Z(m, r) = Q(m, r) - P(m, r). 
1. P(m, 3) = Q(m, 3) FOR THE EQUALLY LIKELY CASE 
Since the notation of the following sections becomes rather cumbersome, we 
shall first derive the function for the special case of three alternatives and equally 
likely choices over the possible profiles. Observe P(m, 3) = Q(m, 3) since in the 
case of three alternatives a cycle occurs if and only if no alternative is preferred by 
a majority to all others. 
Let Q(Xi) be the probability that Xi is preferred by a majority to the other two. 
Then 
3 
(2) Q(m, 3) = E Q(Xi). 
Since, by assumption, the choices over profiles are equally likely, 
(3) Q(X1) = Q(X2) = Q(X3) = Q(m, 3) 3 
Consequently, in order to compute Q(m, 3) we need only find Q(X1) and multiply 
by 3. 
The n = 2m + 1 individuals choose at random from the elements of Sr = S3= 
{U1, . *, 76}. The set Sr contains all possible orderings (profiles) a, of the r alter- 
natives. It thus contains r! elements as enumerated. 
af 1 2 U3 U4 U5 U6 
Xl Xl X2 X3 X2 X3 
X2 X3 X3 X2 X1 Xl 
X3 X2 X1 X1 X3 X2 
Let Ui, where 0 < Ui < 2m + 1, be the number of voters who select profile 
vi E S3, 1 < i < 3!. Ui will, of course, always be an integer. 
We know 
(4) U1 + U2 + ...+ U6 = 2m + 1, 0 < Ui < 2m + 1, 
or 
3! 
(5) Ui = 2m + 1- E Ui. 
i=2 
We write ai(Xj) = k in case, on profile i, there are k - 1 alternatives preferred 
to Xj. That is, Xj is ranked in the kth place on profile i. If oi(Xj) < oi(XI), then Xi 
is ranked higher on profile i than is XI. Thus the committee "prefers" Xi to Xj in 
case a majority of the voters choose profiles ai such that uI(Xi) < cr(Xj). This is 
written XiCXj. 
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CYCLICAL MAJORITY 347 
Define: 
Ali = ai eS3ai(X1) < Ui(Xj)}, j = 2,3, 
A'1 = {ai E S3Joi OA lj}, 
Bij= {ilJicAlj}; 
B'j = {ilaieA'jl}. 
Where the profiles are indexed as enumerated above 
A12 = {O71,O2,O6}; A'12 = {O3,O4,O5}; 
B12 = {1,2,6}; B'12 = {3,4,5}; 
A13 = {Ol1,O2,O5}; A'13 = {O3, U4, 6}; 
B13 = {1,2,5}; B'13= {3,4,6}. 
If a majority of the voters prefer X1 to both X2 and X3, we have 
(6.1) U1 + U2 + U6 > U3 + U4 + U5, 
(6.2) U1 + U2 + U5 > U3 + U4 + U6, 
or 
(7) uj U> Euj, j=2,3. 
ic-Btj i c-B' j
Observe that (5) and (7) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for X1 to be 
preferred to X2 and X3 by a majority. 
Now substituting (5) into (6), we get 
(8.1) 2m + 1 > 2U3 + 2U4 + 2U5, 
(8.2) 2m + 1 > 2U3 + 2U4 + 2U6, 
which simplifies to 
(9.1) m U3 + U4 + U5, 
(9.2) m U3 + U4 + U6, 
or 
(10) m Eu, j = 2,3. 
i c-B'l j 
System (10) simply stipulates that less than half of the individuals choose profiles 
on which either X2 is preferred to X1 or X3 is preferred to X1 . Again, (5) and (10) 
are necessary and sufficient for XiCXi, i = 2, 3. Any solution to the system (5) 
and (10) will be a distribution of the voters among the possible profiles uch that 
X1CXi, i = 2, 3. Further if voters choose profiles such that X1CXi, i = 2, 3, 
then that distribution of voters will be a solution to the system (5) and (10). 
If voters choose among the possible profiles in S3, such that Ui of the voters 
choose profile ai, the probability that a particular U',. . . Ut! occurs is given by the 
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348 F. DEMEYER AND C. R. PLOTT 
multinomial formula as 
(11) P(U1,... U6) =(m U+ . 1)6! 01 
*6 
where Oi is the probability that an individual chooses vi. Since, by assumption,2 
01 =,..., = 06 = l/r! = 1/6, we can simplify (11) to 
(2m + 1)? 6 1 (12) P(Ul,. U6)= ()2mt + - 1 HU 
We can now find Q(X1) by attaching to each solution to (5) and (10) the number 
dictated by (12) and summing all such numbers over all solutions to (5) and (10). 
By substituting (5)into (12), using (3), and summing, we obtain 
(13) 3Q(X1)-Q(m,3)= 3(2m + 1)! f(2) f(6) 6 1 
-(6) U2=0*** U6=0 j=2 Uj!(2m + 1 - jUy 
02m + 1- i,<kUi if k B'1, 1=2,3, 
f(k) = - + 1 <k Ui 2m 
. 
I 
ill<k 
i 
Imin{ i* 1 
t M-li<k Ui, a1l1withkc-B'1a,1{2,3J, 
which is the desired expression. Interms of the profiles as indexed, this is 
(14) Q(m, 3) = (6)2m +1 
rn + I m + 2m + I-U2 M2 + I-U2 
min -U2 min -U2-U3 min< -U3-U4 min? -U3-U4-U5 
2m+1 m Mm-U3 M(m-U3-U4 (m-U3-U4 
X E E E E E [U2! 
U2=o U3=0 U4=0 U5=O U6=O 
X U3!U4! U5! U6!(2m + 1 - Si=2 U)!] . 
2. Q(m, r): PROBABILITY OF PREFERENCE FOR ONE ISSUE 
The derivation of Q(m, r) is a straight forward generalization of the analysis 
contained in Section 1. We start by calculating the probability Q(X,) that X, is 
preferred by a majority to all other alternatives. Observe that 
r 
(15) Q(m,r) = E Q(Xs). 
S= 
Again individuals choose from the elements of Sr = {'1, . .. , r!} with Oi being 
the probability that any particular individual chooses profile vi. 
2 This assumption will be dropped in Sections 2and 3. 
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Let us define: 
Asj = {vi E Sr|Ii(Xs) < (i(X)}; A' = {vi E Sri ? A 
j= 1, 2,...,s-1,s + 1,...r!. 
Bsj = {ilIAi EA}; Bsj = {ilai c- Ai}j. 
Ui is the number of voters that choose vi. The profile as has Xs ranked higher than 
all other alternatives. That is, index the profiles uch that rl has X1 as the most 
preferred, 2 has X2 as the most preferred, etc. 
We know 
r! 
(16) 2m+=I Uj 
i== 1 
or 
r! 
(17) Us=2m+l- E Ui. 
i = 1 
i?s 
Further, XsCXj forj= 1,. . .,s- 1,s + 1, .. ., r only if 
(18) E U > E Ui j =1,...,s-1,s + 1,...,r. 
ic-B,j i-B,sj 
Expressions (17) and (18) are necessary and sufficient for XsCXjj = 1,.. ., s -1, 
s+ 1,...,r. 
Observe that as E Asj for j = s, so s E Bsi for i = s. Thus substitution of (17) into 
(18) yields 
(19) 2m+ 1 >2 E U, j= 1,..,s-1,s+ 1,...,r, 
ic-Bs'j 
which holds if and only if 
(20) m > E Ui, j= 1,. 1.,s- s?1,..,r. 
Thus, systems (17) and (20) are necessary and sufficient for XsCXj,j = 1, ..., s - 1, 
s+ 1,...,r. 
The multinomial formula can now be used in the same way as it was used in the 
previous section. If Oi is the probability that any particular voter chooses vi E Sr, 
the probability that a particular { U*,..., U*} occurs is 
r! 0 Ui 
(21) P(Ul, , Ur!) = (2m + 1)! Ol Ui 
Now to each solution to (17) and (20) we assign the number dictated by (21) and 
sum all such numbers over all solutions to (17) and (20). 
The formula, after substituting (17) into (21) and summing, is 
f(1) f(s-1) f(s+1) f(r!) - r! Ui 
(22) Q(s) = (2m + 1)! E ... E E - E I U 
UX= Us- =O Us+ =0 Ur2= + i (U i) 
(2m + I1 -Si 3s Ui 
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2m + 1- E Ui if k Bsforanyl(l = 1,...,s -1, 
f l(k) =i s+ ,...,r). 
f" l 0~~2m +1 I Ui, i<k 
i?s vmin m - E Ui, all I such that k E Bs1 (I { 1, . ,s - 1, 
t i<k s + 1,...,r}) 
Substitution of(22) into (15) yields the desired expression.3 
3 For the special case where there are only three individuals and where Oi = 1/r!, i = 1, r!, a 
considerably simplified formulation of Q(1, r) can be deduced. Start by deriving the probability that 
some particular issue (Xi) is preferred by a majority to all others. Let 1 choose a profile a c S, on which 
a(Xi) = j + 1. By assumption the probability that j takes any particular value in the interval 
O j r - 1 is 1/r. Given that 1 has chosen a, let 2 choose a profile a' E S, such that U'(Xi) = k + 1 
and such that no issue is preferred to Xi on both a and a'. Otherwise, some issue would be preferred by 
a majority to Xi. The probability 2 makes such a choice is 
I-, if k = 0, r 
I- if 1kAr-(j + 1), 
k' 0, ifk>r-(j+ 1). 
Given that 1 and 2 have selected such profiles, let 3 choose a" E Sr such that U"(Xi) = q + 1 and such 
that no issue which is preferred to Xi on 6" is preferred to Xi on either 6' or 6. The probability with 
which this occurs is 
I -, ifq=0, r 
| I rI r- s ifl<?q <r-(j+k+ 1), 
0, ifq > r-(j + k + 1). 
Now the probability that Xi is preferred by a majority to all others is 
1 r- 1 r-(j+ 1) r-(j+k+ 1) 
Q(X,)= 3 E E E~ F(j, k) -G(j, k, q) r j=O k=O q=? 
where 
Fj,k=E nl -, if k >, 1, 
1, ifk = O, 
ifq 1, 
G(j,k,q) ={sU1 r-s 
1, ifq = 1. 
Simplification, translation of indices, and the observation that fo-r the equiprobable case 
Q(Xi) = (1lr)Q(1, r) yields 
1 r rJi+1 r-jk+2 ( - k)!(r -]j)!(r - 
Q(1, r) = Z (r r w k1 q= (r - 1)!(r - 1)!(r -j - k - q + 2)! 
which is the desired expression. 
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3. P(m, r): PROBABILITY OF COMPLETE TRANSITIVITY 
In this section a function indicating the probability that majority rule results in a 
completely transitive social ordering will be derived.4 We begin by computing the 
probability, P(s), that the profile a, corresponds to the social ordering. There are r! 
transitive social orderings o 
r! 
(23) P(m, r) = E P(s). 
s= 1 
We establish the following definitions: 
fi(as) = {flK(Xj) = i}. The expression fi(cs) is the index of the alternative in the 
ith place on as. 
Aij = {C E Sr,U(Xi) < (XX)}; Ai = {I e SrIO Aij}. 
Bij = {klIke- Aij}; Bij = {klIke Aij}. 
Sr = {1, Ur!l 
Ui is the number of voters choosing profile vi. Thus, Ui is a nonnegative integer. 
If the voters choose profiles such that under majority rule the social ordering 
corresponds to the profile as, the following system of r(r - 1)/2 inequalities must 
be satisfied: 
(24) Uk > Uk, 1i r-1; i + 1 j < r; 
kGBf i(a5)fj(as) kc-BY i(aS)fj(as) i, j integers. 
System (24) simply stipulates that if, for example, 
X3] 
Us = 2 x2 
the voters are distributed among the profiles uch that X3CXi, i = 1, 2, 4,... r, 
and X1CXi, i = 2,4... r, and X2CXi, i = 4, 5, ... r, etc. Again we know 
r ! 
(25) 2m+1= EU, 
i = 1 
or 
r! 
(26) Us=2m + 1- E Ui. 
i = 1 
i?s 
Observe that as is the unique a in 
n Af(as)fj(as) 
1 (irr- 1 
i+ 1 <j(r 
4 The solution to this problem as reported by the authors in [4] is wrong. We are indebted to Morton 
Kamien who found an error in an early draft of this paper. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 14:13:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
352 F. DEMEYER AND C. R. PLOTT 
Substitution of (26) into (24) with simplifications gives 
(27) m > E Uk, 1 i r-1; i + 1 j?1r. 
kGBf i(as)fj(as) 
Together (27) and (25) provide conditions necessary and sufficient hat the 
social ordering correspond to the profile as. 
The multinomial formula (21) can be used as before. We assign to each solution 
to (27) and (25) the number dictated by (21). We then sum these numbers over all 
solutions. Substituting (26) into (21) we obtain the following expression for the 
sum: 
g(l) g(s- 1) g(s+ 1) g(r!) - r! ! i 
(28) P(as)= (2m + 1)! E ......... E E E .... 
[I U1 
I
U1=0 Us-I=0 Us+i=0 Uo ! =? i= 1 o) 
i?s 
02m + 1- li Xs Ui 
S x 
(2m + 1-li s U- ! 
m - Z Uj, all Bf,(,.,)f (a. containing k; 
g(k) = min| JB[fp3(afj(ks) 1 p < r - 1; p +1 < I < r; 
2m+ 1- E Uj. 
j=l 
j?s 
Substitution of (28) into (23) gives the desired functions. 
4. COMPUTATIONS FOR THE EQUALLY LIKELY CASES 
Table I presents everal values for Q(m, r) when Oi = (1/r!).5 As is obvious from 
the formula, the computation involves some fantastically larger numbers. Never- 
theless, the formula is computable (given sufficient time) but there is certainly 
room for simplification. 
Several interesting problems remain. G. T. Guilbaud6 has stated, without 
derivation, that 
lim [1 - Q(m, 3)] = .0877. 
m co 
We have not verified this result. Further, the asymptotic behavior of Q(1, r) can be 
investigated. We conjecture that limr, xQ(1, r) = 0. The results on Table I, however, 
show that the function decreases very slowly. 
Finally, there are many symmetrical aspects of the problem. Perhaps a proper 
characterization of these can yield a statement of the formulas which would allow 
easier calculations and investigations into the asymptotic behavior of the functions. 
'This function was programmed by Mrs. L. Vilms. Computer time was provided by the Herman 
C. Krannert Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Purdue University. 
6 G. T. Guilbaud, "Les Theories de l'interest general et la probleme logique de l'agregation," 
Economic Applique, Vol. 5, 1952, p. 519. This result has been verified by Garman and Kamien [5]. 
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TABLE I 
EVALUATION OF Q(m, r) 
No. of Number of alternatives r
people 
n=2m+1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
3 .94444 .8888 .8399 .7977 .7612 .7293 .7011 .6760 .6536 .6333 .6148 .5980 .5825 
5 .93055 .8611 
7 .92490 
9 .92202 
11 .92019 
13 .91893 
15 .91802 
17 .91733 
19 .91679 
21 .91635 
23 .91599 
25 .91568 
27 .91543 
29 .91521 
31 .91501 
Table II presents everal values of P(m, r). Of course, P(m, 3) = Q(m, 3). The 
new numbers are for P(1, 4) and P(1, 5) which are, as would be expected, lower than 
the corresponding values of Q(m, r). Computation of P(m, r) is somewhat easier than 
the computation of Q(m, r). Even though the number of inequalities to check is 
larger, the number of solutions, which causes the problem, isconsiderably smaller. 
TABLE II 
EVALUATION OF P(mi, r) 
Number of Number of 
people alternatives 
n=2m + 1 3 4 
3 .94444 .8298 
5 .93055 .7896 
7 .92490 
9 .92202 
11 .92019 
13 .91893 
15 .91802 
17 .91733 
19 .91679 
21 .91635 
23 .91599 
25 .91568 
27 .91543 
29 .91521 
31 .91501 
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Nevertheless, the numbers involved in P(m, r) are large. Computation of P(2, 4) 
took five minutes of the IBM 7094. Our programmer estimates that the computa- 
tion of P(2, 5) would take over 100 hours on the same machine and the evaluation 
of Q(2, 5) would take almost three times as long. If further evaluations of these 
functions are desired, it would certainly seem that simplifications are in order. 
Purdue University 
Manuscript received April, 1967; revision received November, 1968. 
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